The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy – Part 11:  Were David Belin and Joe Ball Incompetent Investigators or Competent Liars?

Reading Time: 8 minutes

Reading Guide:

• This section, along with parts 9 and 10, revisits the topic discussed in part 8 (about the Dallas police’s forged photos of the sniper’s nest) but from a different perspective.
• Parts 9 through 11 form a cohesive unit and can be read independently of part 8.
• This part, 11, serves as the conclusion of the “thought experiment” discussed in parts 9 and 10. It is therefore recommended to read those sections first.

Dallas, November 22, 1963 – The Forged Photos of the Sniper’s Nest

Half an hour after President Kennedy’s assassination, three rifle casings were found on the 6^th floor of the Texas School Book Depository. They lay in front of a window overlooking Elm Street, where Kennedy’s car had passed. Three stacks of book boxes stood by the window behind which a shooter could have hidden (see Fig. 1). This space would later become known as the sniper’s nest.

According to Inspector Carl Day and Detective Robert Studebaker, they had taken three photographs of the sniper’s nest at half past one. However, in part 8 of this series, we concluded that the photos had actually been taken at half past three. Between 2 and 3 o’clock, Studebaker—while searching for fingerprints on the boxes—had dismantled the sniper’s nest. After 3 o’clock, both detectives reconstructed the sniper’s nest, put the casings back on the floor, and then took the photographs.

Did Joe Ball and David Belin Tell the Truth?

On behalf of the Warren Commission (which investigated President Kennedy’s assassination), staff members Joe Ball and David Belin conducted the most important part of the investigation: to figure out who had killed Kennedy. In part 8, we assumed that Ball en Belin knew that Studebaker had dismantled the sniper’s nest and that the photos had been staged. Because of the lack of photographs, as well as a description of the original scene, we simply do not know what the sniper’s nest actually looked like at half past 12. Was there enough space for a sniper to sit there with a rifle ready to fire? How difficult would it have been for a potential shooter to exit the sniper’s nest? The latter is crucial in assessing how much time it would have taken Oswald—if he had been the sniper—to reach the lunchroom on the second floor. Oswald’s alibi partly depends on this timing.

In part 8, we concluded that Ball and Belin had deliberately concealed the errors made by Dallas police. The idea that such prominent lawyers would distort the truth, may seem bold. After all, the preface of the Warren Report explicitly states that its goal was “to discover the whole truth.” Years later, this idea was reiterated by staff members of the Warren Commission. For example, the subtitle of David Belin’s 1988 book reads: “The Full Truth About the Assassination of President Kennedy.” Similarly, in 2013, Howard Willens (one of the editors of the Warren Report) provided a detailed account of the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission. The dedication of his book reads: “To my colleagues on the staff of the Warren Commission who knew that Truth was their only client.”

It is almost touching to learn how much members of the American elite value the truth. However, a Frisian proverb says: “Sizzen is neat, dwaen is ‘n ding,” which translates loosely into: “Talking means nothing, only action does.” The emphasis by Belin and Willens that they were telling the truth, reminds me of an incident when I was four years old and had nibbled some brown sugar. As soon as I heard my parents approaching, I hid behind a curtain. When they had entered the living room, I stepped out from behind the curtain and said: “I haven’t been at the brown sugar.” Applied to our subject, this means we should only pay attention to what investigators like Belin and Willens actually did, not what they claimed to have done. In a different context, Noam Chomsky puts this much more eloquently: “The record says more than the rhetoric.”

The Reality of the Investigations into the Kennedy and Tippit Murders

The investigations by Dallas Police and the FBI identified Oswald as the murderer of both President Kennedy and Officer J.D. Tippit. There were no other suspects—a point which is frequently repeated by believers of the Warren Report. This highlights the fundamental dilemma of the Warren Commission: would they have been able to conclude that there was insufficient evidence against Oswald? If so, lacking any other suspects, both murders would have remained unsolved. It would have taken exceptional courage for the Commission to publish such a conclusion.

If any people would be able to do that, the seven members of the Warren Commission would. They represented the pinnacle of the American elite. The chairman was Chief Justice Earl Warren and former governor of California. The second most prominent member was Allen Dulles, who had served for nearly ten years as head of the CIA. Another member was Gerald Ford, who would become President of the United States. The Commission further included the leaders of both the Republican and Democratic parties in the House of Representatives, two senators, and a former international banker. They bowed to no one and could have mustered that courage.

The Commission’s approach, however, was a different one. Within a month after having  assembled their staff, the Warren Commission conducted interviews with Oswald’s widow, his mother, and his brother. So, the Commission immediately proceeded under the assumption of Oswald’s guilt. In part 5 of this series, we discussed Officer J.D. Tippit’s murder, which occurred 45 minutes after Kennedy’s assassination. Having stepped out of his police car, Tippit was killed. No one clearly saw the shooter, but someone was observed walking quickly away from the crime scene. However, witnesses were at least 65 feet away, making any identification unreliable.

In part 5 we concluded that Joe Ball covered up the way in which Dallas Police had so cavalierly conducted the first line-up. In the course of the interrogations, upon learning how poorly the line-up had been executed, Ball went “off the record” twice, in order to discuss the matter privately with the witnesses. As a result, we do not know the details of these discussion. We do know, however, that Oswald was dressed in torn clothing, with a head wound, and standing handcuffed between two well-dressed police officers. Instead of the standard six participants, the line-up consisted of only four individuals—making it easy to identify “the culprit.”

The Warren Report does not describe the flawed execution of the lineup. It does, however, conclude that the line-up had been conducted according to procedure. But that was certainly not the “whole truth.”It is difficult to figure out why the Warren Report chose to obscure the true circumstances of the line-up. Had the Commission been truly committed to the truth, it should have criticized Dallas police. It would then have had to rely on the  evidence that (possibly) proved Oswald’s guilt: the casings found at the Tippit crime scene had been fired from his gun. Had the Commission been afraid that criticizing Dallas police would lead readers to suspect that the other evidence might also have been tampered with?

Criticism of the Warren Report

After the publication of the Warren Report, together with 26 volumes of Hearings and Exhibits, it came in for a lot of criticism. According to the critics, many facts that emerged during testimony were not incorporated into the final Report, but simply ignored. In 1967, these contradictions were meticulously and expertly documented by Sylvia Meagher. She did not, however, highlight the unreliable nature of the police line-up described above.

Years later, Belin and Willens lashed out at their critics, but carefully avoided addressing the contradictions between witness testimonies and the Warren Report’s final conclusions. Instead, they employed a convenient tactic. They singled out the weakest critics, and by debunking their arguments made it appear as though all critics were wrong. Belin and Willens had taken sides in 1964, which they steadfastly adhered to ever since. It suggests that once a side is taken, it is nearly impossible to change one’s opinion.

Truth May Be Dangerous

Adhering to an honest investigative approach was entirely out of the question in two other instances of fraudulent behaviour by Ball and Belin, as discussed in parts 7 and 8 of this series. The first example concerns the investigation by Dallas police of the 6^th floor of the Texas School Book Depository. According to Officer Mooney, Captain Will Fritz picked up the casings before any photographs had been taken. This was entirely wrong: an experienced detective always leaves the crime scene undisturbed until it has been photographed and documented. Mooney mentioned this twice during his testimony, yet Belin ignored it both times. When Fritz himself was interrogated, it did not come up at all. Had the Warren Report genuinely sought to uncover the “whole truth”, it should have criticized Dallas police. But it failed to do so.

Criticism of Dallas Police Was Not Considered an Option

Taking a second example, it is apparent why criticism of Dallas police was not seen as a viable path. The Warren Report makes no mention of the open envelope in which the casings were put, even though this was a crucial fact. Because of the open envelope, it would have been possible to swap casings by putting casings from Oswald’s rifle (which was in the possession of Dallas police since half past two) in the envelope.

If we consider the investigative methods still practised by Dallas police in the 1970s (as discussed in part 5 of this series), the possibility of evidence tampering was very real. It is obvious that the Warren Report chose not to mention this possibility: it would have undermined the entire investigation. Therefore, reference to the open envelope is nowhere to be found in the Warren Report.

Ignoring the Forged Photos

In part 9, we introduced a thought experiment to reassess, from an alternative perspective, the conclusion that Ball and Belin had deliberately violated the truth. We initially hypothesized that Ball and Belin acted in good faith and did not know that Studebaker had dismantled the sniper’s nest. Consequently, they sincerely believed that the photos were real.

However, in parts 9 and 10, we noticed Ball and Belin making so many mistakes and overlooking so much crucial information, that intentional deception seems more likely. Let us have a brief look at a number of crucial mistakes made by Ball and Belin. Assuming an honest investigative approach, the failure to call journalists Tom Alyea and William Allen as witnesses is inexplicable. The journalists had been in and around the Texas School Book Depository all day. But there was another factor too. The incompetence of the police investigation must have been obvious to Ball and Belin. On November 22, neither a crime scene diagram of the sniper’s nest nor of the southeast corner of the 6^th floor was made. It wasn’t until November 25 that a layout would be made — by which time the crime scene had been badly contaminated. Neither a description of the southeast corner of the 6^th floor, nor a chronological list of the photos was made. The photos taken on November 22, showed only part of the sniper’s nest. Yet, Belin failed to ask Day a single critical question about this. In fact, the Warren Report does not discuss the investigation of the sniper’s nest at all.

Furthermore, Belin never wondered why Day did not remember where the sniper’s nest was located. Initially, Day took photos from the wrong window because he did not know which window the shots had been fired from — despite having photographed the sniper’s nest, including the casings, just two hours previously. During the interrogation of the police officers involved in the investigation of the sniper’s nest, no crucial questions were asked. Time and again, Ball and Belin failed to ask the obvious questions, making it seem like intentional mistakes. The idea that Belin made so many mistakes, becomes even more implausible when we consider his top performance in 1975.

David Belin as Head of the Rockefeller Commission in 1975

Ten years after the Warren Commission investigation, Belin was at his best. By late 1974, an increasing number of reports surfaced about illegal CIA operations. The agency had allegedly opened thousands of private letters (a direct violation of mail secrecy laws) and had even plotted assassinations of foreign leaders, including those in Cuba and Chile. In response, President Gerald Ford established a commission led by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. However, the real investigative work was carried out by David Belin, whom President Ford appointed as executive director.

Belin made every effort to force the CIA to hand over all documents related to its illegal activities. Extracting information from an agency built on secrecy was – to put it mildly –  no easy task. Yet, within a few months, Belin managed to uncover most of the essential data. His strategy was to pressure the CIA by pointing out that the commission would probably obtain much of the information independently, even without the agency’s cooperation. Years later, in 1988, Belin candidly admitted that this was partly a bluff. However, he also warned the CIA that, if it became common knowledge that it had refused to cooperate, its reputation and its ability to function in the future would be damaged. In his own words:

“There is great virtue in prompt and full disclosure where errors have been made. The refusal to admit wrong promptly can at times have greater adverse ramifications than the wrong itself.”

Source: David Belin, Final Disclosure, p. 90.

This approach proved to be effective. For example, Belin, noticing that a section of a report he had received from the CIA was missing, persistently demanded the omitted information. Eventually, he succeeded in obtaining it. The missing section contained details about the CIA’s failed assassination attempts on Cuban leader Fidel Castro—attempts in which the CIA had collaborated with – of all people – members of the American Mafia.

Competent Liars or Incompetent Investigators?

Belin’s performance in 1975 was exceptional. But was this the same Belin who had piled one mistake on another in 1964? Had he really improved that much in just ten years? Given Belin’s investigative skills in 1975, another scenario regarding the Warren Commission inquiry seems more plausible. Belin probably told Dallas police the same thing he would later tell the CIA: that admitting mistakes is better than covering them up. In 1964, Ball and Belin, having figured out that the photos were forgeries, urged Dallas police to come clean. In exchange, they probably promised them not to ask awkward questions during the interrogations. As we showed in part 10, they had kept their promise.

Additionally, they probably agreed to cover the mistakes made by the police with the cloak of charity, in order to achieve the “correct” outcome: identifying Oswald as the lone assassin. The experience Belin gained from this approach in 1964 may have contributed to his success in 1975. By cornering a powerful organization like the CIA, Belin proved that he was an outstanding investigator. This makes it highly unlikely that the 16 errors, listed in parts 9 and 10, were simply the result of poor investigative work. Thus, we may venture the conclusion that Ball and Belin were not only competent investigators, but competent liars as well.

But Does It Even Matter?

Regardless of how one chooses to characterize Joe Ball and David Belin—whether as skilled liars or incompetent investigators—the core problem with the Warren Report remains enormous. Because, if the investigation of the sniper’s nest was either incompetent or dishonest, what does that tell us about the other evidence used to prove Oswald’s guilt? Whether due to poor investigative work or to deliberate deception, distrust of the Warren Report is more than justified in either case.

Sources

Literature: Warren Report (1964) p. 137 -142; Four Days: The Historical Record of the Death of President Kennedy (1964); Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact. The Warren Commission, the Authorities and the Report (New York 1992, orig. 1967); David Belin, Final Disclosure: The Full Truth About the Assassination of President Kennedy (New York 1988); Howard P. Willens, History will prove us right: Inside the Warren Commission Report on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy (New York 2013); Noam Chomsky and Nathan J. Robertson, The Myth of American Idealism: How US Foreign Policy Endangers the World (London 2024).

Source Figure 1:

Dallas (Tex.). Police Department. Boxes in the Texas School Book Depository, photograph, 1963~; (https://texashistory.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metapth49475/m1/1/: accessed December 18, 2024), University of North Texas Libraries, The Portal to Texas History, https://texashistory.unt.edu; crediting Dallas Municipal Archives.

Plan for the next parts

• Part 12: The discovery of the rifle on the 6^th floor of the Texas School Book Depository (April 2025).
• Part 13: Warren Commission’s reconstruction of the time it took Baker and Truly to reach the lunchroom on the first floor (April 2025).
• Part 14: Reconstruction of the time it actually took Baker and Truly to reach the lunchroom on the first floor (April 2025).
• Part 15: Warren Commission’s reconstruction of the time it took Oswald to get from the 6^th floor to the lunchroom (May 2025).
• Part 16: Reconstruction of the actual time it must have taken Oswald to get from the 6^th floor to the lunchroom (June 2025).
• Part 17: Discovery of the paper bag (in which the rifle would have been carried by Oswald) on the 6^th floor.
• Part 18: The missing hour: Oswald at the Dallas police station between 2:00 and 3:00 PM on Friday, November 22, 1963.
• Part 19: Interrogations of Oswald on November 22, 23, and 24, 1963.