The Assassination of President John F. Kennedy – part 5: The Execution of the First Two Line-ups on November 22, 1963

Reading time: 10 minutes

Dallas: Friday night, November 22, 19.20 hours

“Oh, that’s the way it is going to be?”. That is probably what Lee Harvey Oswald said on Friday night, when he was officially charged with the murder of Officer J.D. Tippit. He said he was innocent and later that evening he would repeat that twice to the journalists of the world press gathered in the Dallas police station.

A few hours earlier, the police had held two ‘line-ups’ (see blogs 3 and 4). This involved putting Oswald between three distractors. Three witnesses (Markham, Callaway and Guinyard) attended these line-ups. They said they recognized Oswald as the perpetrator of Tippit’s murder (Helen Markham) or that they had seen him walk away from the scene of the crime (Callaway and Guinyard). Until 7 o’ clock, these identifications were the only evidence Dallas Police had. But what was this evidence worth?

In blogs 3 and 4, the issue of the distances between the witnesses and the fugitive have been discussed in depth. The Warren Report (the official investigative report published in September 1964) systematically reduces these distances. For more than half a century the ‘rule of 15’ has been applied: if one sees someone for the first time at a distance greater than 16 yards (or 15 meters), a subsequent recognition (for instance in a line-up) must be unreliable. The witnesses who saw the pedestrian near de scene of the crime were (much) further away than 16 yards. Because of this, their identification on November 22 is debatable, to say the least.

Fear and perception

In the case of Helen Markham, there is another factor why her perception was not reliable. As discussed in blog 3, Helen Markham was very upset after Tippit’s murder and also when she attended the lineup. Her anxiety greatly reduces the reliability of her identification of Oswald. The Warren Report does not mention Helen Markham’s hysteria, nor what had been done about it by Dallas police. No wonder the Report can call her a reliable witness. Alfredda Scobey, the only female staff member of the Warren Commission, showed more honesty than the Warren Report in her 1965-article. According to her, Helen Markham had been very upset indeed: “They had given her sedatives and she remained hysterical for a few hours after the lineup.” Therefore, according to her, Helen’s identification of Oswald as the murderer had been unreliable.

Implementation of the first two line-ups on November 22, 1963

What conditions should a correctly executed line-up meet? First of all, there should be at least 5 distractors in the line-up. Recent research indicates that when there are fewer than 5 distractors, the line-up becomes very unreliable. The Dallas Police Department had put Oswald between three distractors instead of the required number of five (see also picture 1). The 1962 Scotland Yard Criminal Investigation manual also addresses the number of distractors required for a reliable line-up. If a witness says that he or she can recognize the suspect, so the manual states, put the suspect between ten (10!) distractors and ask the witness to pick him out. This is a bit of an exaggeration: research shows that a line up does not become more reliable with more than 5 distractors.

Moreover, it is important that prior to the line-ups, clear instructions are given to the witnesses, something of the sort: “the suspect may not be in the line-up.” This is meant to prevent guessing by the witnesses. Often, officers do in fact tell the witnesses that the suspect has already been caught and ask them to point him out. On November 22, prior to the line-ups with Oswald, this was exactly what Dallas Police had told the witnesses. Experience shows that witnesses may well try to point to the person that most closely resembles the one they saw, without being sure whether it is indeed the same one.

Why was Oswald identified as the perpetrator?

Victor Bugliosi, author of the heftiest book on the November 22 murders, believes that the November 22 line-ups were flawed, because Oswald had a head wound which he had sustained in the course of his arrest. Bugliosi, however, is convinced of Oswald’s guilt in both murders (of President Kennedy as well as Officer Tippit). Even though the line-ups were not executed correctly, Bugliosi believes the outcome is not worthless:

“If he didn’t look just like the man they saw at the murder scene, why would they all (not just one) say he did?” (Bugliosi, Endnotes p. 135, note 76)

To be perfectly clear, the three witnesses (Markham, Callaway and Guinyard) did not say that Oswald resembled the suspect, they said he was the same person. And that is peculiar: because of the great distance at which they had seen the man, one would expect them to note some resemblance, if at all. Outright recognition, however, was out of the question.

Even though Bugliosi himself gave one reason why Oswald had been identified as the perpetrator (the head wound), there were other reasons too, why Oswald stood out in the line-up. This is perhaps the most important condition for a reliable identification: none of the persons in the line-up should look conspicuous. There is an objective method to check this: let someone who knows nothing about the case take a look at the line-up first, and if they choose the right person (i.e. the suspect), the line-up is wrong. On November 22 no such test was performed.

A Poorly Dressed Suspect

Before he started interrogating the witnesses, Joe Ball, one of the assistant counsels of the Warren Commission, knew that Oswald was dressed conspicuously. This is evident from the leading questions he asked. So, for example, in the course of the interrogation of officer Boyd on April 6, 1964:

Ball: “Well, his clothes were a little rougher in character than the other three, weren’t they?”

Boyd: “Well, could have been.”

Ball: “The other three were better dressed than Oswald, would you say?”

Boyd: “Well, yes, sir; I would say they probably were.”

Source: Hearings before the President’s Commission, Volume 7, p. 127.

Officer Sims, who led the second lineup, was asked the same leading question. He replied: “Well, I don’t imagine that he would be dressed as nice as the Officers were.” On April 9, officer Ables, who was part of the first and the second line-up as No. 4, was interrogated. There the issue became even clearer:

Ball: “How were you dressed when you went in the showup room?”

Ables: “I was wearing a white shirt and this sweater here [indicating].”

Ball: “Then you were dressed about like you are dressed today, is that right?”

Ables: “Yes.”

Ball: “Off the record.” [Discussion off the record]

Source: Hearings Before the President’s Commission, Volume 7, p. 240; (time: April 9 at approx. 9.50)

It goes without saying that Ables had put on nicer clothes for the occasion (which took place under oath), and so, on November 22, while standing in the line-up and wearing the same clothes as when he was interrogated by the Warren Commission, he was also dressed neatly. Because of Ables’ answer, Ball decided to go ‘off the record’. What would have been discussed? Two weeks later, Ball asked Captain Fritz in the same leading way, whether Oswald was dressed a little less neatly than the three officers. Fritz’s reply was quite neutral: “Well, I don’t think there was a great deal of difference.” Ball made no further comment.

A Perfectly Cuffed Suspect

So, Oswald had not been put between five random distractors, but between three neatly dressed police officers. On April 2, 1964, Sam Guinyard was asked if the four men in the lineup were handcuffed to each other. “Yes, they were” said Guinyard. The report Sims and Boyd wrote about the course of events on November 22, also states that the four people were all handcuffed. In the course of the interrogation on April 6, Boyd and Sims confirmed this.

So, on April 9, Ball blithely asked Richard Clark, one of the three police officers in the line-up, the same question. According to Clark, Oswald was handcuffed to him and his colleague Bill Perry. Next to Perry was another officer, Don Ables. The conversation between Ball and Clark proceeded:

Ball: “What about Mr. Ables?”

Clark: “Mr. Ables was standing to the left.”

Ball: “Was he handcuffed?”

Clark: “No, sir.”

Ball: “Off the record.” [Discussion off the record]

Source: Hearings Before the President’s Commission, Volume 7, p.237; (time: April 9, at approx. 9.15)

So, twice within the hour, Ball interrupted the interrogation at a crucial point. “Darn”, Ball must have thought, “did they really mess up the line-ups?” You would expect that, to be on the safe side, he would have asked a few more questions and that he would have asked  the other two officers, Perry and Ables, the same question. But he did not do that. Well, he probably discussed it, judging by “Discussion off the record”, but that discussion did not make it into the interrogation report. In the course of the next two interrogations, Ball wisely did not bring up the issue of the handcuffs again. Therefore, it is evident that Clark was telling the truth.

Two weeks later, Ball again raised the question whether all four participants in the line-ups were handcuffed, by asking Captain Will Fritz, who had arranged the line-ups: “They were all handcuffed together, were they?” But, again Fritz did not let his tongue run away with him. He thought that all four were handcuffed, but he wasn’t quite sure. And Ball was forced to settle for that.

So, in fact, all three witnesses were too far away from the suspicious pedestrian to be able to identify him later on. But the implementation of the line-ups made it very easy for them to point to Oswald. He stood out because he had a head wound and sloppy clothing, and he  was handcuffed to two smartly dressed officers, while the third neatly dressed officer stood next to them, and was not handcuffed. So it must have been obvious who the crook was. As if there had been a large arrow pointing at Oswald’s head, saying: this is the culprit.

More issues about the line-ups on November 22  

To make matters worse, there are two more issues about the way the Dallas line-ups were conducted. In most European countries, the officer in charge of the line-up, must not be  know who the suspect is. After all, he interrogates the participants of the line-up and therefore he may inadvertently (or deliberately) give the suspect away. This is called the “double-blind” condition: neither the officer nor the witnesses should be allowed to know who the suspect is.

To this day, this rule is not compulsory in the United States. And it was not applied on November 22, 1963. But that does not mean that it is an anachronism to mention this condition. In our case, this condition is especially important. Oswald was suspected of having murdered a police officer. The officer’s colleagues who conducted the line-ups (Leavelle conducted the first one and Sims the second one) knew the suspect and could have given him away. Ball never raised this issue with the officers.

In the case of “cop killers”, rules are regularly violated in the United States. So in 1976, for example, in the case of Randall Adams. Like Oswald, he was suspected of having murdered an officer in Dallas. Dallas police then falsified witness statements to put Adams behind bars.

Finally, a line-up will also be unreliable, if witnesses have seen photos of the suspect before the line-up has taken place. Both Callaway and Guinyard attended the second line-up at half past six on Friday, November 22. In the meantime, they may have seen pictures of Oswald on TV or in the papers. Callaway said he had been working all the time and had not watched TV or read a newspaper. But when he got home? How certain ware we that he had not  watched TV before leaving for the police department? After all, the assassination of a President was not a daily occurrence. Ball did not ask about that. And Guinyard was not even asked whether he had seen pictures of Oswald beforehand.

Conclusion

It is not unlikely that on November 22, after the murder of their colleague, J.D. Tippit, Dalles Police settled for a fast, very sloppily executed line-up. After all, police officers were always in danger of being killed, so it was important to act quickly. The underlying idea was to convey the message that cop-killers will be caught without fail.

But that poor excuse does not apply to the Warren Commission. We saw above that Ball went “off the record” twice, after noticing that the line-ups had not been executed in the right way. And yet, the Warren Report concludes: “The Commission is satisfied that the lineups were conducted fairly.” This means that the Commission deliberately lied when it gave its blessing to the way the line-ups had been implemented.

But the Commission did know better. For one thing, the Report reduces the distances at which Markham, Callaway and Guinyard had observed the suspect. Thereby it gives the impression that the identification was a foregone conclusion. The Commission also glosses over Oswald’s shabby clothing, which contrasted with the neatly dressed three officers. It fails to mention that Oswald was handcuffed to two officers, while the third officer stood next to them, without handcuffs. It does not mention Helen Markham’s mental state before and after she attended the line-up. Neither does it mention the peculiar way in which Joe Ball got Helen Markham to identify Oswald as the perpetrator. It does not address the fact that the number of distractors was too small for a reliable line-up.

And finally, the Commission does not address the issue in what way the witnesses actually had identified Oswald as the pedestrian. The explanation for their identification is obvious. It was not because they remembered who they had seen, but because of the  way the line-ups were conducted.

Sources

Warren Report, 167-169; Alfredda Scobey, “A Lawyer’s Notes on the Warren Commission Report”, American Bar Association Journal 51 (January 1965) 39-43; Sylvia Meagher, Accessories After the Fact (New York 1992; orig. 1967), 255-258, who does not discuss the distances at which the observations were made, nor the way Oswald and the distractors were handcuffed; Dale Myers wrote 700 pages about the murder of Officer Tippit (according to him Oswald was the perpetrator): With Malice, 216 (Helen Markham) and 221-223 (Callaway en Guinyard), but he does not criticize the way the first two line-ups were executed, nor does he discuss the way Oswald was handcuffed; Randall Dale Adams, Adams v. Texas (New York 1991).

Hearings:  Ted Callaway 3H 351-357 (March 26, 1964); Sam Guinyard 7H 395-401 (April  2) ; L.C. Graves 7H 251-260 (April 6); Sims 7H 158-186 (April 6); Boyd 7H 119-137 (April 6); on the morning of April 9, the three officers who were with Oswald in the first two line-ups, were interrogated: Ronald Clark (7H 235-239) Bill Perry (7H 232-235), and Don Ables (7H 239-243); Captain Will Fritz 4H 202-249 (April 22); David L. Johnston 15H 503-513 (June 26).

Affidavits of Markham, Callaway en Guinyard in CE 2003: 24H 195-404); FBI-report on Helen Markham: CD 630C; FBI-report on Ted Callaway: in CD 735. CD is an abbreviation of  Commission Documents, containing all the documents of the Warren Commission (for reference, see the website of the Mary Ferrell Foundation: www.maryferrell.org). A small part (the Commission Exhibits) was published in November 1964: Hearings Before the President’s Commission on the Assassination President Kennedy, Volumes 16 – 26.

About the conditions for a reliable line-up: Richard L. Jackson, Criminal Investigation: A Practical Textbook for Magistrates, Police Officers and Lawyers (London 1962); Gary L. Wells, Eric P. Seelau, Sheila M. Rydell, C.A. Elizabeth Luus, “Recommendations for properly conducted lineup identification tasks”, in: David Frank Ross, J. Don Read, Michael P. Toglia (eds.) Adult Eyewitness Testimony: Current Trends and Developments (Cambridge 1994) 223-244; Margaret Bull Kovera, Andrew J. Evelo, The Case for Double-Blind Lineup Administration (2017), on: www.apa.org (retrieved on June 17, 2023).

Translated by Ite Wierenga